March 08, 2006

JHU, JVP reject Geneva agreement in All Party Conference

Sinhala extremist parties, Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) and Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), during the All Party Conference (APC) held Monday at the Old Parliamentary building in Colombo submitted separate memoranda rejecting the agreement made between the Government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers in the talks held in Geneva on 22-23rd February, parlilamentary sources said.



Leaders and representatives of all political parties except Tamil National Alliance (TNA) participated in the conference. TNA was not invited.
Leader of Sri Lanka Government delegation, Minister Sripala de Silva explained the details of Geneva talks.
Somawanse Amerasinghe, leader of JVP, speaking at the conference said, "Geneva talks did not adhere to the Mahinda Chintanya but instead was conducted according to Norway's wishes. Norway has succeeded in fulfilling the demands of the Liberation Tigers. If the Government disarms armed groups is agreed in Geneva, it should also disarm the LTTE. Future talks should ensure that the Cease Fire Agreement (CFA) is corrected and amended."
Mr Amerawanse also said, the Sri Lanka Government should urgently strengthen Sri Lanka's military.
Leader of JHU, Ven. Ellawala Medananda Thero, speaking at the Conference said that JHU will strongly oppose any effort to disarm any armed group and that the next round of talks should be held in Colombo.

LTTE protest to Sri Lanka Government over amendment issue

These attempts to distort and misinterpret the joint statement issued by the parties after the Geneva talks will damage mutual trust and seriously undermine the peace process", Mr. Balasingham said.
"We regret to note that Mr H.L. De Silva, senior lawyer and a delegate of the government’s negotiating team, issued a statement to the ‘Daily Mirror’ today reiterating his fabulous theory that the Ceasefire Agreement was amended. His new set of arguments are ludicrous and feeble and do not reinforce the logic of his contention. Mr Silva’s central theme is that the issues discussed and undertakings given by the parties in the joint statement are not specifically mentioned in the original document and therefore constitute an amendment of the earlier Agreement."
"This argument is untenable and seriously flawed since the undertakings given by the parties reflect and correspond to the cardinal issues of the CFA and fall within its conceptual framework. Even if the issues discussed transcend the confines of the text of the original truce, they cannot be construed as amendments. For example, there were six joint statements issued after six sessions of talks between Ranil Wickremasinghe’s government and the LTTE, which recorded several decisions taken and undertakings given by the parties, most of which were not specifically mentioned in the CFA, but are conceptually related issues of the truce. That doesn’t mean all the issues discussed and undertakings given by the parties amounted to amendments", Mr Balasingham explained.
"Amending the clauses of the CFA is a very serious matter, which needs the approval of the parties in conflict and the facilitating government, and endorsement by the signatures of the President of Sri Lanka, the leader of the LTTE and the Norwegian Foreign Minister. I am surprised that Mr H.L. De Silva has taken this international Agreement superficially, ignoring or failing to understand its implications. His thesis is illogical and incoherent, based on pure fantasy. This intervention by Mr Silva, we can only conclude, is politically motivated, aimed at placating the Sinhala hardliners, but certainly not a constructive engagement to promote peace", Balasingham pointed out.

Building Tamil Eelam State

"Within the areas they control, LTTE runs a de facto state administration, which includes revenue collection, police and judiciary as well as public services and economic development initiatives. This political-territorial division means that Sri Lanka has a de facto dual state structure with LTTE also exercising considerable influence on state institutions and officials in the government-controlled parts of the North-East provine, write Prof Stokke.
Prof Kristian StokkeOn the prospects of democracy in NorthEast, Sokke says, "While the operation of the new state institutions is circumscribed by the unresolved conflict, this combination of autonomy and embeddedness give the emerging state a substantial degree of administrative capacity. This may provide an institutional basis for a more democratic relationship between the LTTE and citizens in North-East Sri Lanka."
Stokke quotes Prof Uyangoda, Head of Political Science Colombo University on the need to address long term transformation during conflict resolution process, "Scholars within the conflict transformation approach acknowledge the centrality of formal peace processes but argue that the conflict resolution school focuses too narrowly on elite negotiations and peace pacts, calling instead for attention to the broad and long-term transformation of grievances, forces and strategies."
Pointing out that "functional state failure, i.e. the inability of the state to fulfil its security, welfare and representation fuctions, is at the core of the conflict and also the attempt to build a new state apparatus in the North- East, Stokke writes, "The state building project of the LTTE is also closely linked to their political project of representing the Tamil nation and delivering self-determination for the Tamil nation...The political background for the creation of the Tamil Eelam judicial system was the experienced failure of the Sri Lankan Constitution to provide a functioning framework for realisation of minority rights and aspirations, combined with the subversion of Rule of Law by the Prevention of Terrorism Act and protracted warfare."
"Social welfare is the other state function that has been given a central place in the building of the LTTE state, although in a subordinate role to that of maintaining external and internal security through military, police and judicial me," Stokke says on LTTE's approach to the supporting the welfare of Tamil people, and on development he adds, "The development work of the LTTE after the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement has focused on the development of institutional capacity to address relief and rehabilitation needs and, not the least, the need for coordination of development initiatives."
Stokke also details the contribution of Tamils Rehabilitation Organization (TRO) and the Economic Consultancy House (TECH) in the evolving Tamil eelam state.
Stokke concludes: "The dominant form of governance embedded in the LTTE state institutions is that of a strong and centralised state with few formal institutions for democratic representation, but there are also elements of partnership arrangements and institutional experiments that may serve as a basis for more democratic forms of representation and governance. This is contingent, however, on both a peaceful resolution of the current state of insecurity for Tamils and the LTTE, and on the facilitation and dynamics of pro-democracy forces within the LTTE and in Tamil society at large.

President faces fire but firm on peace

The joint statement issued after the two day talks in Geneva came under heavy fire by opposition parties at the all party conference yesterday -- deepening the confusion over the peace process, though President Mahinda Rajapaksa vowed he would go ahead with it.As the third round of the APC held at the Presidential Secretariat to brief the political parties on the Geneva talks, the opposition parties complained that Chief Government Negotiator Nimal Siripala de Silva’s opening comments were not in accordance with what was stated in the joint statement, at the end of the Geneva meeting. Addressing the conference President Mahinda Rajapaksa however pledged to adopt a broader approach at the next round of talks with the LTTE on April 19, 20 and 21. Minister de Silva in his opening speech at Geneva had said certain clauses in the Ceasefire agreement violated the Constitution of the country. However at the end of the meeting the two parties released a statement saying they would abide by the ceasefire agreement. The main Opposition UNP’s Deputy Leader Karu Jayasuriya said contradictory statements were made by Minister de Silva. “Talks were started saying the CFA is against the Constitution. But the talks closed on a note accepting the CFA. The joint statement is contradicting the views of the Co-chairs to the peace process”, he said.He said that UNP would prefer to hold direct talks with the President rather than saying a few words facing the camera at a meeting like the APC. Deputy Leader Karu Jayasuriya said the government or the Opposition alone could not bring a final solution to the ethnic conflict. “ The government with a mandate of 51% or the main Opposition that claimed a mandate of 48% cannot rule out this reality. Both parties should stop hunting for scapegoats when things go wrong”, he said.The Ceylon Workers Congress (CWC) told the Daily Mirror that they welcomed the talks but that the delegates should now stand by the result without “marring” its effect. The party also stressed that the Tamil people of the South did not need a representation at the talks. The country’s third force, the JVP yesterday urged the government to strengthen the armed forces as a means of compelling the LTTE to continue negotiations.“We firmly believe that it is better to walk away from the negotiation table without any progress being made, rather than agreeing to any conditions detrimental to the sovereignty of the country,” the JVP leader Somawansa Amarasinghe told the All Party Conference.He also urged that the government team should actively work towards rectifying the mistakes made at the Geneva talks.The JVP leader said the government and the people were hopeful that the next round of peace talks would lead towards a lasting solution to the armed conflict.The Government ally, Jathika Hela Urumaya threatened to withdraw support and even vowed to take to streets if the government fails to rectify certain mistakes they did at the last round of talks. Blaming the government for taking over the responsibility to disarm the Karuna faction, the JHU called it a mistake on the part of the government to do so. SLMC spokesman Hasan Ali told the Daily Mirror they too believed there were major contradictions in the statements made by Minister de Silva. “It is not only the military who are at the receiving end of violence but a lot of Muslims were also killed though not signatories to the ceasefire agreement”, he said.Mr. Ali said the SLMC insisted on the need to have a separate Muslim delegation at the talks. CWC’s Deputy Leader R. Yogarajan said, “We welcome the talks and firmly believe that the CFA is the basis of the peace process. The criticism of all parties is towards the joint statement. We congratulate the delegation and the President and think that the two statements made before the talks were good. The pragmatic movement of the talks by the Government brought the meeting to a fruitful conclusion. However the future of the talks depends on the implementation of the agreement in full. Therefore we urge the Government to take all possible measures to ensure this.”“The CWC disagrees with Western Province People’s Front MP Mano Ganeshan’s suggestion of sending a separate delegation to the talks on behalf of the Tamils in the South. Our stance is that there is no constitutional need for devolution of power to find solutions for the issues facing the Tamil population in the South as in the North and East. Their problems can be solved through the administrative powers vested in the President,” he said.

Peace Talks: Round two on human aspects

Humanitarian issues concerning the people in the North and East (N&E) will figure prominently in the agenda when the second round of talks between the government and the LTTE begin in Geneva between April 19-21, Presidential Advisor Nivard Cabraal, said.
He told the Sunday Observer that before attention is focused on issues such as power sharing, humanitarian issues would be addressed to provide relief to the people in the N&E. He said issues relating to the Ceasefire agreement too will be taken up at these Talks.
Asked what issues the Government was concerned as 'immediately humanitarian', he said that priority will be given to relocate people who were affected by the war and the tsunami. "In addition, we must ensure that economic benefits directly reach the affected people without any hindrance", he pointed out.
Livelihood development projects will be given priority along re-settlement, he noted.
"Our main intention is to restore normal life in the N&E first, before we discuss other sensitive issues. Otherwise, it will be difficult to reach a final solution", he noted. The negotiators also plan to get the consent of the LTTE to allow other parties to conduct their political activities in the N&E to ensure the democratic rights of all citizens.
However, the LTTE is expected to take up sensitive issues like relocation of people in the High Security Zone areas and to relax security checks in the N&E, LTTE sources confirmed.
The LTTE is also expected to take up the issue of territorial waters while stressing the need for fishermen to carry out their routine work.

Govt. gears for next round of Geneva talks

The Government held its first preparatory meeting ahead of the next round of talks that is expected to address the contentious issue of high security zones, officials said.

The Steering Committee meeting on Wednesday, presided over by Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera ran for more than 2 ½ hours and was attended by almost all the peace negotiators, with the exception of those who were overseas.

The meeting began with a debrief from the Government negotiation team on the ups and downs of the two-day meeting at Chateau de Bossey, just outside Geneva.

JVP and JHU members were also present. They commended the delegates on their performance at the negotiating table and for securing a fresh date for more talks but had expressed their displeasure over the eight-paragraph joint statement the Government and the LTTE had agreed on. Both the JVP and the JHU signed separate pacts with then Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa ahead of the November Presidential election that amounted to overhauling the Norwegian-brokered peace process.

They pointed out that the joint statement was not in accordance to these agreements. But officials say neither the JVP or the JHU were expected to tip the scales or move to jeopardize next month’s talks and they were merely recording their stand.

The opening statement by chief negotiator Nimal Siripala de Silva received particular praise during the meeting, which pushed for a fresh truce agreement, calling the existing ceasefire pact ‘unconstitutional and illegal.’
In Geneva, the large Government team was commended by various quarters about its impressive preparation for the February 22-23, talks and officials said the team planned to keep up the work and discuss preparations for the April 19-21 meeting, set to also take place in Geneva.

The LTTE has already indicated it wanted high security zones to top the agenda but the Government is also likely to push for other issues to be taken up as a matter of priority.

Human rights is one such that the Government may want to discuss at the next round, senior officials involved in the process said. Since there was no prepared agenda for last month''s talks, the Government delegation had armed itself for various alternatives, including suggested amendments to the February 22, 2002 truce.

Some of this documentation may be taken back for the April talks, the officials said. But moves are also going ahead to try and agree with the LTTE on an agenda through the Norwegian facilitators ahead of the next round.
The just concluded round of talks dwelt with child recruitment by the LTTE and paramilitary or armed groups.

Officials involved in the process say these issues may be left out of the next round, but this will only depend if both sides feel satisfied that they both have upheld their pledge to end the violence.

Five DIGs in the north and east were summoned for a meeting in Colombo on Friday with Defense Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa and IGP Chandra Fernando.
During the two-hour meeting, the police chiefs discussed the dip in violence in the region and were told to take all necessary measures to keep the peace.
"The main issue of disarming paramilitary cadres in Sri Lanka Army controlled areas would be the key in demonstrating Colombo''s commitment," S.P. Thamilselvan, the Tiger''s political chief said after the talks.

The LTTE negotiation team is due to arrive in the island on Tuesday.
The Tigers were informed last week that their 12-member delegation must not arrive in a staggered fashion as it impedes the logistics to transport them back to the Wanni.

After previous rounds of talks, the LTTE has always stayed back to visit various other countries and hold talks with state officials and the Tamil diaspora.

Likewise, after the Swiss talks last month, the LTTE held meetings in Switzerland before leaving for the Norwegian capital Oslo the following week.
An earlier scheduled visit to Iceland after the Oslo visit was abruptly called off.

Sri Lanka Peace: Efforts, Failures and Lessons

Dr Rupesinghe has also organized a symposium of peace making which commenced from 22nd and is in progress at Colombo Inter Contintinental Hotel, where several internationally well known specialists including Ed Garcia from International Alert, UK, are participating. Presentations were made by Minister Sarath Amunugama, Prof. G.L. Peiris, Bradman Weerakoon, Prof. Jayadeva Uyangoda, Dayan Jayatilleka, Kumar Rupesinghe followed by discussions.
Secretary of Ministry of Defense, Austin Fernando (2002-2004)Mr Austin Fernando, in the chapter titled "Peace Process and Security Issues," says that UNF government of Ranil Wickremesinghe carefully balanced the security imperatives with peace making measures in formulating its peace strategy, and carried out the Cease Fire Agreement (CFA) in an environment conducive to confidence building. He quotes Dr Saman Kelegama who has commented that UNF strategy was aimed at locking the LTTE into a negotiation process through economic incentives and internationalisation of the process. UNF's period of peace making was marked by risk taking and out of the box bold decision making, Mr Fernando says.
Peace Process and Security Issues: Austin Fernando
Press Release on Book Launch
Mr Fernando cautions that, "to achieve peace, having a CFA in place or several negotiating sessions will not suffice. It requires having a good understanding of the other’s needs, aspirations, ideologies, demands etc. Tolerance with firmness towards the misdeeds of the other party, patience, and total commitment to make a peace move to forge ahead."
Mr Fernando considers each security related Article of the CFA and reveals the strengths and weaknesses of the CFA. This information gains significance in the context of the current talks in Geneva between the LTTE and the Government of Sri Lanka and its focus on strengthening the implementation of the CFA. He also briefly addresses the effect of manipulative politics, occasional negative responses of the military, LTTE, media and international actors to highlight the threats of peace making.
On not taking President Kumaratunge into confidence during the pre-CFA period, Mr Fernando writes: "The CFA was a stepping stone for a political and negotiated settlement. However, the CFA contents were not divulged to the President beforehand, though she was the Commander in Chief, Head of State and Head of the Cabinet. With the political culture all parties have inherited, these cohabitation problems were inevitable. The justification to “hide” may have been the fear that she might derail the process for political expediency. Her later actions (i.e. takeover of three ministries inclusive of Defence on November 3rd 2003) proved how correct this assumption was."
Commenting on the current Sri Lanka Government's approach, Mr Fernando says, "The latest demand in Southern Sri Lanka is to redraft or review the CFA in order to attain peace with the ulterior motive of controlling the LTTE by strengthening the CFA. The experience with the LTTE shows that they are obstinate to such moves as their attention is limited to a clear cut objective, for which one individual takes responsibility.... ...Their demands are firm, and any attempt to revise them will be faced with similar difficult demands from the LTTE. Therefore, any change should be thought of only at a formal negotiation according to the CFA and that too very cautiously."
"The unseen security affairs are not minor in volume, and thus, what has been achieved so far could only be the tip of the iceberg. The need to find working arrangements to face certain issues has already commenced and more such interventions may be required as the process moves forward. In that event, the need to co-operate with each other and with the Monitors and Facilitator will become quite important. In doing so, consideration must be paid to revisiting the role, functions, powers and authority of the Facilitator and Monitors, and changes thereof, for more effective and efficient peacemaking. One should not lose sight of the fact that all these should be done only with consensus and not ex-parte," Mr Fernando adds.

Dr. Kumar Rupsinghe, Chair of the Foundation for Coexistence, formerly the Secretary General of the London based organisation International Alert. Dr. Rupesinghe has authored and edited numerous publications in the field of conflict resolution.A review of the two book volumes appears in the Thursday edition of Daily Mirror said, "Overall, these two volumes document the events leading to each phase of negotiations, explain or, try to explain some of the imperatives that drove the decisions, and draw lessons to be learnt to be used in future negotiations...This is essential reading for, especially, peace activists, politicians in decision making roles within party structures, media personnel, diplomats and high officers of the defence establishment."

Ceasefire Agreement is foundation of peace and must be implemented

Addressing the delegations of the Sri Lanka and Norwegian governments and representatives of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) as well as the other LTTE negotiators, Mr. Balasingham said that it was the lack of implementation, rather than any weaknesses in the CFA itself, that had led to the serious breakdown of peace and security.
“The Ceasefire Agreement is a well crafted, valid instrument of peace, devised for the purpose of bringing an end to hostilities and to create a positive environment conducive for meaningful negotiations,” Mr. Balasingham said.
“It is the truce agreement that has helped to avert the out-break of an all-out war and created the present environment where both the parties could engage in a dialogue to enhance the conditions of peace and normalcy in the war affected northeast,” he said.
Mr. Balasingham singled out the GoSL’s failure to disarm Army-backed Tamil paramilitaries as a key cause for the undermining of the CFA.
He also pointed that Army’s failure to withdraw from civilian settlements incorporated into High Security Zones and the military’s continued imposition of harsh restrictions on fishing are having a devastating effect on the lives of the Tamil people in the Northeast.

LTTE delegation
The full text of Mr. Balasingham’s address follows:
The Opening Address by Anton Balasingham, the chief negotiator of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, (LTTE) at the Peace Talks in Geneva on 22 February 2006.
The most constructive achievement of the Norwegian facilitated peace process has been the signing of the Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), exactly four years ago today, on the 22 February 2002. The event brought an end to the bloody ethnic war that lasted more than two decades, causing massive scale death and destruction. Though the truce agreement has been subjected to enormous strains, particularly during the latter part of 2005, it still holds, having prevented the parties in conflict from embarking on major armed confrontations. I should say that it is the truce agreement that has helped to avert the out-beak of an all-out war and created the present environment where both the parties could engage in a dialogue to enhance the conditions of peace and normalcy in the war affected northeast.
The Ceasefire Agreement was not formulated in haste to the advantage of one party, as some critics have argued, but rather, given careful and meticulous scrutiny to all aspects - terms, conditions and obligations – of the truce by both parties, with the skilled assistance of the Norwegian facilitators. The Ceasefire Agreement is a well crafted, valid instrument of peace, devised for the purpose of brining an end to hostilities and to create a positive environment conducive for meaningful negotiations. Therefore, the Ceasefire Agreement should be viewed as an effective mechanism that can facilitate and promote the peace process.
We are of the opinion that the Ceasefire Agreement is the foundation upon which the peace process has to be built. It is true that in recent times the truce accord has been severely undermined as a consequence of the rapid escalation of violence in the northeast, particularly during the latter part of last year and in January this year, when it turned into an ugly form of a shadow or subversive war. This violent phenomenon has been characterised by arbitrary killings, abductions and disappearances of Tamil civilians in the northeast. According to authentic records, 109 Tamil civilians have been arbitrarily killed by the Sri Lankan armed forces with the active assistance of the Tamil paramilitaries. Forty eight civilians have disappeared after being arrested or abducted by the Sri Lanka military. This horrendous violence was unleashed against Tamil civilians, particularly in Jaffna, with the sinister objective of terrorising the Tamil civilian population. This terrorisation of our people was intended as collective punishment against the whole Tamil population for the many soldiers killed in the subversive war.
Our delegation will submit, for your scrutiny, comprehensive reports providing detailed information about the nature of violence committed against Tamil civilians by the Sri Lankan armed forces since the new government took office on 19 November 2005. We will also submit detailed reports about civilians killed and injured by the Sri Lankan armed forces and Tamil paramilitaries during the entire ceasefire period of the last four years.
Similarly, we suppose that your government is going to submit detailed reports of acts of ceasefire violations, allegedly committed by the Liberation Tigers.

GoSL delegation
Your government has already released statistics accusing the LTTE of committing 5464 violations of ceasefire during the last four years. We cannot accept such exaggerated figures as authentic acts of ceasefire violations. A huge majority of those figures are attributed to recruitment. These are cases of under aged youth said to be joining the LTTE. Your government, as well as the SLMM, have accused the LTTE of under aged recruitment, without taking into consideration the complex child rights issues in the northeast and the number of children released by the LTTE under the Action Plan for the War affected Children undertaken in association with UNICEF. Mr Tamilselvan will give you a briefing later on the child rights situation in the northeast.
In this context I wish to point out that the government as well as the SLMM have conveniently ignored the vast number of ceasefire violations committed by the Tamil paramilitaries in the form of arbitrary killings of civilians, political assassinations, abductions, harassment, extortion, intimidation, assault, torture and forced conscription of children. Most of these crimes committed by paramilitaries are blamed on the LTTE. I am sorry to say that it is only recently that the SLMM has realised the negative consequences of the violence of the Tamil paramilitaries and expressed serious concern that such ‘armed elements’ are posing a serious threat to peace. Since the criminal violence of Tamil paramilitaries has become a critical issue in the implementation process of the truce agreement, the government should give serious thought to containing such forces in order to stabilise the conditions of peace.

The main topic for discussion at this negotiating table is the Ceasefire Agreement. As the parties in conflict who entered into this peace accord, we must endeavour to seek practical ways of implementing the Ceasefire Agreement effectively, so that the truce becomes constructive, productive and meaningful. We are of the view that the recent escalation of violence, that brought the parties to the brink of an all-out war, was primarily due to the non-implementation of the obligations of the truce.
The implementation of the confidence building measures, as enunciated in the articles of the Ceasefire Agreement, are extremely crucial to the process of the de-escalation and normalisation. The following are the key elements of the Ceasefire Agreement stipulated as confidence building measures that are vital to create conditions of normalcy in the northeast.
Clause 1.2. Neither party shall engage in any offensive military operations.
Clause 1.8. Tamil paramilitary groups shall be disarmed by the GOSL by D-day + 30 at the latest. The GOSL shall offer to integrate individuals in these units under the command and disciplinary structure of the GOSL armed forces for service away from the Northern and Eastern Province.
Clause 1.13. As of D-day + 90, all unarmed LTTE members shall be permitted freedom of movement in the North and East.
Clause 2.1. The Parties shall in accordance with international law abstain from hostile acts against the civilian population.
Clause 2.2., 2.3., 2.4. stipulate places of worship, school premises and public buildings ‘occupied by either party shall be vacated and returned to the intended use’.
Clause 2.5. The Parties shall review the security measures and the set-up of checkpoints, particularly in densely populated cities and towns, in order to introduce systems that will prevent harassment of the civilian population.
Clause 2.11. A gradual easing of fishing restrictions shall take place starting from D-day. As of D-day + 90, all restrictions on day and night fishing shall be removed subject to certain exceptions…
Clause 2.12. The Parties agree that search operations and arrests under the Prevention of Terrorism Act shall not take place.
Ever since the truce agreement was signed the Government of Sri Lanka has failed to implement these key clauses. The LTTE has repeatedly appealed to the government to fulfil its obligations under the peace accord. We have also taken up the issue of the non-implementation of the terms and conditions of the Ceasefire Agreement during our peace talks with Mr Ranil Wickremasinghe’s government. All our genuine efforts to ensure the full implementation of the key elements of the Agreement became futile.
The co-habitation conflict, or rather, the power struggle between the Wickremasinghe government and President Kumaratunga became a serious impediment to advance the peace process and to secure proper implementation of the ceasefire.
With the termination of the peace talks, the security situation in the north east began to deteriorate.
The violence of the Tamil paramilitaries intensified in the form of a dirty subversive war directed against our cadres and supporters, a shadow war in which the Sri Lanka armed forces actively colluded with the Tamil armed groups. We will submit for your examination a comprehensive report on Tamil paramilitary organisations operating in the northeast and in Colombo. The report provides ample evidence on the existence of the main paramilitary groups, their leadership, the command structure, the location of their camps and their close relationship with the Sri Lanka armed forces, particularly with the Sri Lanka military intelligence.
The existence of Tamil armed paramilitary groups is an indisputable fact. Since these Tamil armed organisations are sustained, supported and controlled by the Sri Lanka military, we categorise them as paramilitaries. They are not simply ‘armed elements’ functioning independently in a political vacuum, as some people assume. They are well organised militant forces, properly trained and armed in subversive warfare and function covertly in connivance with the Sri Lanka armed forces. Some of the armed organisations have a long history, extending to more than two decades. Originally they took arms for a political cause, but later, with the Indian intervention in Sri Lanka, they abandoned their political ideals and became mercenary armed groups under the Indian Peace Keeping Forces to fight against the LTTE.
Following the withdrawal of the IPKF, these armed organisations changed their loyalty and allegiance to ‘new masters’, that is, the Sri Lanka state and its military and intelligence apparatus, in the war against the LTTE. Though these armed groups registered themselves as political parties and claimed to have entered the democratic political mainstream, they have not dismantled their military units nor have they abandoned armed violence. We have, in our report, listed several incidences of armed violence committed by these Tamil paramilitary groups in which several leaders and cadres of our organisation, as well as prominent parliamentarians, journalists, educationists and civilian supporters, were executed in cold blood. We will provide maps in our report indicating the close proximity of paramilitary camps of the EPDP and other groups to Sri Lankan army camps and police stations.
You are well aware that Clause 1.8 of the Ceasefire Agreement specifically stipulates that the Tamil paramilitaries should be disarmed by the GOSL. Yet, the Sri Lanka government, to date, has failed to honour this crucial obligation, which is vital for strengthening the conditions of peace and normalcy. The SLMM has also warned that the peace environment is seriously threatened by the violence of these Tamil armed groups. The international community, represented by the Co-Chairs, have also made statements calling upon your government to disarm the paramilitaries and to put an end to their violent activities. In a recent statement President Rajapkse has pledged that he would rein in the Tamil armed organisations and would not allow them to function in the government controlled areas.
There are five major paramilitary groups operating in the northeast and in Colombo. They are known as Karuna group, EPDP group, PLOTE group, EPRLF (Varaithar) group and a Muslim Paramilitary group called Jihad group. In our report we have given detailed information about each group, the names of leaders and area operational commanders functioning in various districts and in the capital. We are certain that the Sri Lankan military hierarchy, particularly the Sri Lanka military intelligence, is well aware of the existence and activities of the Tamil armed paramilitaries. Nevertheless, we are also providing you with detailed factual information to reinforce our argument.
It is the considered view of our liberation organisation, as well as the general opinion of the Tamil people, that the armed violence of the Tamil paramilitaries is posing a grave threat to peace and stability in Tamil areas and endangering the Ceasefire Agreement. Therefore, we call upon the Government of Sri Lanka to disarm these Tamil paramilitary organisations, fulfilling a crucial obligation of the truce agreement.
One of the crucial confidence building measures laid down in the Ceasefire Agreement is that the parties, in accordance with international law, should abstain from hostile acts against the civilian population. Clauses 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 stipulate that the Sri Lankan armed forces, within a limited time frame, should vacate places of worship, schools and public buildings.
In defiance of these truce obligations and in grave violation of international humanitarian law, the government’s security forces, for more than a decade, continue to occupy schools and public buildings and made places of worship inaccessible to the Tamil civilian population. Several places of worship made inaccessible are Hindu sacred shrines of historical and cultural importance, so dear to our people. In Jaffna alone 35 prominent schools were forced to close down and 201 Hindu and Christian places of worship have been made inaccessible to our people. This vicious type of military occupation has seriously offended the cultural and religious sensitivities of the Tamil people, an activity specifically forbidden by the Ceasefire Agreement.
The creation of High Security Zones (HSZ) by the Sri Lankan armed forces in the militarily occupied territories of the northeast, particularly in the densely populated Jaffna Peninsula, has caused immense suffering to the Tamil civilian population. To facilitate the occupation of a huge number of troops, amounting to fifty thousand, the so-called High Security Zones were established by forcefully evicting several thousands of Tamil families from their homes. The worst affected region is the Jaffna Peninsula where entire villages were evicted with the civilian population and thousands of houses forcefully usurped and our people denied access to farmlands, fishing coasts, schools and places of worship. This is a grave injustice committed against the Tamil people by the invasion forces, destroying their social and cultural life.
We will submit to you a document on, ‘The Human Costs of the High Security Zones’, which provides comprehensive information about the nature of Sinhala military occupation of the Tamil region and its implications on the life of our people. Our statistics on HSZ shows that 28,830 house owners in Jaffna have been forcefully evicted from their homes and nearly 13,000 acres of fertile farmlands made inaccessible to them. The creation of High Security Zones has reduced 20,000 families to conditions of destitution and they have been languishing in refugee camps and welfare centres for over a decade. The forceful usurpation of public property to the extent of 30 percent of the landmass of Jaffna under the claim of High Security Zones, and denying our people their right to return to their homes and property is a blatant violation of human rights. This forced eviction of people by the state under the pretext of national security is condemned by several UN Human Rights instruments as gross violations of human rights. These UN instruments characterise this practice of forced evictions by states as serious crimes inflicting grave and serious harm to the basic civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of large numbers of people, both individual and collective (The issue is best explained in the United Nations High Commission on Human Rights Fact Sheet 25 on ‘Forced Evictions’).
The displacement of several thousands of families and their pathetic plight in subnormal conditions in the refugee camps has become a formidable humanitarian tragedy. Yet the Sri Lankan state and the military hierarchy continue to deny, on security grounds, the basic rights of our people to return to their homes and property. We wish to point out that the Sri Lankan government should no longer ignore this grave humanitarian issue under the pretext of ‘security’. The problem of the HSZ has to be resolved without further delay, facilitating the resettlement of the internally displaced persons. The resolution of this issue is extremely crucial for the restoration of peace and normalisation of civilian life in Tamil areas.
In this brief statement I have touched on a few of the crucial issues to be addressed for the effective implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement. The other most important issue to be addressed is the severe restrictions imposed on fishing and the enormous suffering of the people as a consequence. We have given comprehensive information in our documents in regards to the suffering of the Tamil fishing community. We will take up the issue on the restrictions on fishing during the course of our discussions.
The other important matter we wish to raise is the freedom of movement of our political cadres in the government controlled areas. You are aware that the LTTE leadership withdrew our political cadres from the government controlled Tamil areas as a consequence of the violent activities of the paramilitaries, who, on several occasions attacked our unarmed cadres and bombed our political offices. Our political cadres can only function in government controlled areas if the paramilitaries are disarmed and normalcy returns to Tamil areas.
In concluding I wish to say that we do agree that there have been serious breaches of the Ceasefire Agreement, for which the parties in conflict, as well as the Tamil paramilitaries, should bear culpability. Nevertheless, I wish to point out that it would serve no meaningful purpose if we enter into a recriminatory debate, making accusations and counter accusations against each other over the abuses of the truce. Instead of engaging in acrimonious bickering that might poison the atmosphere of goodwill, it would be prudent to engage in a constructive discussion, exploring ways and means to stabilise and strengthen the Ceasefire Agreement. You will certainly agree with me that consolidating the Ceasefire Agreement is the only practical way open to the parties in conflict to stabilise the conditions of peace and normalcy, which are essential and crucial to take the peace process forward.

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